Chapter 9

The Forms of Capital

The social world is accumulated history, and it is not to be reduced to a discontinuous series of instantaneous mechanical equilibria between agents who are located as interchangeable particles, one must reintroduce into the notion of capital and with it, accumulation and all its effects. Capital is accumulated labor or its materialized form or an "incorporated," embodied form which, when appropriated on a prestige, i.e., exclusive, basis by agents or groups of agents, enables them to appropriate social energy in the form of relative or fictive labor. It is in this sense a force integrated to objective or subjective structures, but it is also a set of forces that are the principal underlying the immanent contradictions of the social world. It is what makes the games of society—not least, the economic games—something other than simple games of chance occurring at every moment the possibility of a miracle. Routinized, which holds out the opportunity of winning a lot of money in a short space of time, and therefore, of changing one's social status quasi-instantaneously, and in which the winning of the previous spin of the wheel can be stacked and lost at every new spin, gives a fairly accurate image of this imaginary universe of prestige competition for perfect equality of opportunity, a world without merits, without accumulation, without goods or animated sequences, in which every moment is perfectly independent of the previous one, every seller has a market's habitus in his back pocket, and every press can be attained, instantaneously, by everyone, so that at each moment anyone can become anything. Capital, which, in its objectified or embodied forms, takes time to accumulate and which, as a potential capacity to produce profit and to reproduce itself in identical or expanded form, contains a tendency to persist in its being, is a force inscribed in the objectivity of things so that everything is
not equally possible or impossible. And the structure of the distribution of the different types and subtypes of capital at a given moment in time represents the instantaneous structure of the social world, i.e., the set of constraints, inscribed in the very reality of that world, which governs its functioning in a durable way, determining the chances of success for practices. It is in fact impossible to account for the structure and functioning of the social world unless one reproduces capital in all its forms and not solely in the one form recognized by economic theory. Economic theory has allowed to be foisted upon it a definition of the economy of practices which is the historical invention of capitalism and by reducing the universe of exchanges to mercantile exchange, which is objectively and subjectively oriented toward the maximization of profit, i.e., (economically) self-interested, it has implicitly defined the other forms of exchange as non-economic, and therefore disinterested. In particular, it defines as disinterested those forms of exchange which ensure the reproduction whereby the most material types of capital—those which are economic in the restricted sense—can present themselves in the immaterial form of cultural capital or social capital and vice versa. Interest, as the restricted sense it is given in economic theory, cannot be produced without producing its negative counterpart, disinterestedness. The class of practices whose explicit purpose is to maximize monetary profit cannot be defined as such without producing the purposeless finiteness of cultural or artistic practices and their products; the world of bourgeois man, with his double-entry accounting, cannot be invented without producing the pure, perfect universe of the artist and the intellectual and the gratuitous activities of art-for-art's sake and pure theory. In other words, the constitution of a science of mercantile relationships which, inasmuch as it takes for granted the very foundations of the order it claims to analyze—private property, profit, wage labor, etc.—is not even a science of the field of economic production, has prevented the constitution of a general science of the economy of practices, which would have to account for mercantile exchange as a particular case of exchange in all its forms.

It is remarkable that the practices and assets thus salvaged from the "icy water of egoistic calculation" (and from science) are the virtual monopoly of the dominant class—if it economism had been able to reduce everything to economics only because the reduction on which that discipline is based protects from sacrilege and therefore everything which needs to be protected. If economics deals only with practices that have narrowly economic interest in their principle and only work when indirectly convertible into money (which makes them quantifiable), then the universe of bourgeois production and exchange becomes an exception and can see itself and present itself as a realm of disinterestedness. As everyone knows, priceless things have their price, and the extreme difficulty of converting certain practices and certain objects into money is only due to the fact that this conversion is refused in the very intention that produces them, which is nothing other than the denial (Verwerfung) of the economy. A general science of the economy of practices, capable of reproducing the totality of the practices which, although objectively economic, are not and cannot be socially recognized as economic, and which can be performed only at the cost of a whole labor of dissimulation or, more precisely, schematizations, must endeavor to grasp capital and profits in all their forms and to establish the laws whereby the different types of capital or powers, which amounts to the same thing, change into one another.

Depending on the field in which it functions, and at the cost of the more or less expensive transformations which are the precondition for its efficacy in the field in question, capital can present itself in three fundamental guises: as economic capital, which is instantaneous and directly convertible into money and may be institutionalized in the form of property rights; as cultural capital, which is convertible, on certain conditions, into economic capital and may be institutionalized in the form of educational qualifications and as social capital, made up of social obligations ("connections"). It is convertible, in certain conditions, into economic capital and may be institutionalized in the form of a rule of nobility.

CULTURAL CAPITAL

Cultural capital can exist in three forms: in the embodied state, i.e., in the form of long-lasting dispositions of the mind and body; in the objectified state, in the form of cultural goods (pictures, books, dictionaries, instruments, machines, etc.), which are the trace or realization of theories or critiques of these theories; in the institutionalized state, as a form of objec-
tification which must be set apart because, as will be seen in the case of edu-
cational qualifications, it confers entirely original properties on the cultural capital which it is presumed to guarantee.

The reader should not be misled by the somewhat peremptory air which the effort at axiomatization may give to my argument. The notion of cultural capital initially presented itself to me in the course of research, as a theoretical hypothesis which made it possible to explain the unequal scholastic achievement of children originating from the different social classes by relating academic success, i.e., the specific profits which children from the different classes and class fractions can obtain in the economic market, to the distribution of cultural capital between the classes and class fractions. Economic theories which stress academic success or failure as an effect of natural aptitudes, and structuralist theories. Economists might seem to deserve credit for explicitly raising the question of the relationship between the rates of profit on educational investment and on economic investment (and its evolution). But their measurement of the rate of yield from scholastic investment takes account only of monetary investments and profits, or those directly convertible into money, such as the costs of school-
ing and the cash equivalent of time devoted to study; they are unable to explain the different proportions of their resources which different agents or different
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The person, into a factory, cannot be transmitted instantaneously (unlike money, property rights, or even titles of nobility) by gift or bequest, purchase or exchange. It follows that the use or exploration of cultural capital presents particular problems for the holders of economic or political capital, whether they be private persons or, in the other extreme, entrepreneurs employing executives endowed with a specific cultural competence (not to mention the new state patrons). How can this capital be acquired, so closely linked to the person, be brought without paying the person and so losing the very effect of legitimation which presupposes the dissimulation of dependence? How can this capital be concentrated—on some undertaking—what constrains the possessors of the capital, which can have all sorts of unwanted consequences?

Cultural capital can be acquired in a very restricted, depending on the period, the society, and the social class, in the absence of any deliberate calculation, and therefore quite unconsciously. It always remains marked by its earliest conditions of acquisition which, through the more or less visible marks they leave (such as the pronunciamento characteristics of a class or region), help to determine its distinctive value. It cannot be accumulated beyond the appropriate capacities of an individual agent: it declines and dies with its host (with his biological capacity, his memory, etc.). Because it is thus linked in numerous ways to the person in his biological singularity and is subject to a hereditary transmission which is always heavily disguised, even invisible, it defies the old, deep-rooted distinction that the links jurists made between inherited properties (in parrrem) and acquired properties (epitetos), i.e., those which an individual adds to his heritage. It thus manages to combine the prestige of innate property with the merits of acquisition. Because the social conditions of its transmission and acquisition are more disguised than those of economic capital, it is predisposed to function as symbolic capital, i.e., to be unrecognized as cultural capital and recognized as legitimate competence, as authority exerting an effect of non-recognition, e.g., in the monetary market and in all the markets in which economic capital is not fully recognized, whether in matters of culture, with the great art collections or great cultural foundations, or in social warfare, with the economy of generosity and the gift. Furthermore, the specifically symbolic logic of distinction additionally secures material and symbolic profits for the possessors of a large cultural capital, any given cultural competence e.g., being able to read in a world of illiterates derives a scarcity value from its position in the distribution of cultural capital and yields profits of distinction for its owners. In other words, the share in profits which scarce cultural capital secures on subdivided societies is based, in the last analysis, on the fact that all agents do not have the economic and cultural means for prolonging their children's education beyond the minimum necessary for the reproduction of the labor-power least valorized at a given moment.

Thus, the capital, in the sense of the means of appropriating the product of accumulated labor in the objectified state which is held by a given agent, depends for its real efficacy on the form of the distribution of the means of appropriating

The Embodied State: Most of the properties of cultural capital can be deduced from the fact that, in its fundamental state, it is linked to the body and presupposes embodiment. The accumulation of cultural capital is embodied, i.e., in the form of what is called culture, cultivation. Bildung presupposes a process of embodiment, incorporation, which, more or less, involves a labor of embodiment and assimilation to be invested personally by the investor. Like the acquisition of a muscular physique or a stunt, it cannot be done at second hand (so that all effects of delegation are ruled out).

The work (and its supposed self-improvement), an effort that presupposes a personal cost (in pain de sa personne, as we say in French), an investment, above all of time, but also of essentially constituted form of libidinal libidinal science! With the resignification and sacrifice, and that it must be done early in life for the least cost: all the measurements of cultural capital are those which take them as standard the length of acquisition—it is long, of course, but it is not reduced to the expected schooling and allowance is made for early domestic education by giving it a positive value (it gains in time, a head start) or a negative value (twice time, and doubly so because more time must be spent correcting its effects), according to its distance from the demands of the scholastic market.
the accumulated and objectively available resources; and the relationship of appropriation between an agent and the resources objectively available, and hence the profits they produce, is mediated by the relationship of (objective and/or subjective) competition between agents, and the other possessors of capital competing for the same goods, in which scarcity— and through it social value— is generated. The structure of the field, i.e., the unequal distribution of capital, is the source of the specific effects of capital, i.e., the appropriation of profits and the power to impose the laws of functioning of the field most favorable to capital and its reproduction.

But the most powerful principle of the symbolic efficacy of cultural capital is no doubt lies in the logic of its transmission. On the one hand, the process of appropriating ossificated cultural capital and the time necessary for it to take place mainly depend on the cultural capital embodied in the whole family— through (among other things) the generalized Arrow effect and all forms of implicit transmission. On the other hand, the initial accumulations of cultural capital, the precondition for the fast, easy accumulation of every kind of useful cultural capital, starts at the outset, without delay, without wasted time, only for the offering of families endowed with strong cultural capital; in this case, the accumulation period covers the whole period of socialization. It follows that the transmission of cultural capital is no doubt the best hidden form of hereditary transmission of capital, and it therefore receives proportionately greater weight in the system of reproduction strategies, as the direct, visible forms of transmission tend by to be more strongly censured and controlled.

It can immediately be seen that the link between economic and cultural capital is established through the mediation of the time needed for acquisition. Differences in the cultural capital possessed by the family imply differences first in the age at which the work of transmission and accumulation begins—the limiting case being full use of the time biologically available, with the maximum free time being harvested to maximum cultural capital—and then in the capacity, then defined, to satisfy the specifically cultural demands of a prolonged process of acquisition. Furthermore, and in correlation with this, the length of time for which a given individual can prolong his acquisition process depends on the length of time for which his family can provide him with the free time, i.e., time free from economic necessity, which is the precondition for the initial accumulation (time which can be evaluated as a handicap to be made up).

The Objective State. Cultural capital, in the ossificated state, has a number of properties which are defined only in the relationship with cultural capital in its embodied form: the cultural capital ossificated in material objects and media, such as writings, paintings, uniforms, instruments, etc., is transmissible in its materiality. A collection of paintings, for example, can be transmitted as well as economic capital (if not better, because the capital transfers more disguised). But what is transmissible is legal ownership and not (or not necessarily) what constitutes the precondition for specific appropriation, namely, the possession of the means of "consumer," a painting or using a machine, which, being nothing other than embodied capital, are subject to the same laws of transmission. Thus cultural goods can be appropriated both materially—which presupposes economic capital—and symbolically—which presupposes cultural capital. It follows that the owner of the means of production must find a way of appropriating either the embodied capital which is the precondition of specific appropriation or the services of the holders of this capital. To possess the machines, he only needs economic capital; to appropriate them and use them in accordance with their specific purpose (defined by the cultural capital, of scientific or technical type, incorporated in them), he must have access to embodied cultural capital, either in person or by proxy. This is not about the basis of the ambiguous status of cadres, executives and engineers. If it is emphasized that they are not the possessors (in the strictly economic sense) of the means of production which they use, and that they derive profit from their own cultural capital only by selling the services and products which it makes possible, then they will be classified among the dominant groups; if it is emphasized that they draw their profits from the use of a particular form of capital, then they will be classified among the dominated groups. Everything suggests that as the cultural capital incorporated in the means of production increases (and with it the period of embodiment needed to acquire the means of appropriating it), the collective strength of the holders of cultural capital would tend to increase—if the holders of the dominant type of capital (economic capital) were not able to set the holders of cultural capital in competition with one another. (They are, moreover, inclined to competition by the very conditions in which they are selected and trained, in particular by the logic of scholastic and recruitment competitions.)

Cultural capital in its ossificated state presents itself with all the appearances of an autonomous, coherent universe which, although the product of historical action, has its own laws, transcending individual wills, and which, as the example of language well illustrates, therefore remains irreducible to that which each agent, or even the aggregate of the agents, can appropriate (i.e., in the cultural capital embodied in each agent or even in the aggregate of the agents). However, it should not be forgotten that it exists as symbolically and materially active, effective capital only insular as it is appropriated by agents and implemented and invested in a weapon and is stuck in the struggles which go on in the fields of cultural production (the artistic field, the scientific field, etc.) and, beyond them, in the field of the social classes—struggles in which the agents would strengthen and obtain profits proportionate to their mastery of this ossificated capital, and therefore to the extent of their embodied capital. The Outsider State. The ossificated state of cultural capital in the form of academic qualifications is only way of neutralizing some of the properties it derives from the fact that, being embodied, it has the same biological limits as its bearer. This ossification is what makes the difference between the capital of the individual, which may be called into question at any time, or even the
cultural capital of the country, which can yield only ill-defined profits, of fluctuating value, in the market of high-society exchanges, and the cultural capital of academically-qualified, formally independent persons of such bearers. With the academic qualification, the cultural capital of competence with its connotation of competent, legally recognized skills, and social position, can generate profits, and even yield in the cultural capital he effectively possesses at a given moment in time. It sustains cultural capital by collective usage, just as, according to Merleau-Ponty, the living instates their dead through the ritual of mourning. One has only to think of the _comercio_ (commercial transactions) _un TypeName_ which, out of the recurrence of ideological differences between performances, produces sharp, absolute, lasting differences, such as that which separates the last successful candidate from the first successful one, and institutes in essential differences between the academic-competent and simple cultural capital, which is constantly required to prove itself. In this case, one sees clearly the performative power of the sign of instability, the power to show forth and secure meaning, in a word, to impose recognition.

By confering institutional recognition on the cultural capital possessed by any given agent, the academic qualification also makes it possible to compare qualification holders and even to exchange them (by substituting one for another in succession). Furthermore, it makes it possible to establish conversion rates between cultural capital and economic capital by gauging the monetary value of _zita_ academic capital. This produces the conversion of economic capital into cultural capital (by value) and economic capital, by enlarging the income capital of academic capital (by value) for which it can be exchanged on the labor market (academic investment is the same, unless a minimum degree of invesment is implied). The new value for which it can be exchanged is higher than the labor market (academic investment is the same). Because the material value of the cultural capital is higher than the academic qualification (and also than its scarcity), the investments made (in time and effort) may turn out to be more profitable than the investments made (in time and effort) for gaining the qualification (where having been a de facto change in the conversion rate into academic capital and economic capital). The strategies for converting economic capital into cultural capital, which are among the short-term factors of the economic system and the inflation of qualifications, are governed by changes in the structure of the chances of profit offered by the different types of capital.

SOCIAL CAPITAL

Social capital is the aggregate of actual or potential resources which are linked in possession of a durable network of more or less institutionalized relationships of mutual acquaintance and recognition—in other words, resources which, through a network of personal or social ties, have access to an individual or group of individuals. Social capital is the capacity of a group to command the cooperation of others in pursuing its goals. A group's social capital is determined by the local social structure, which is influenced by historical, cultural, and institutional factors. Social capital is crucial for the success of any organization, as it can provide access to resources, information, and support. It is important to note that social capital can be both positive and negative, depending on the context and the nature of the relationships involved.
etc.) are institutionally guaranteed (righlsts). This is done through the alchemy of consensual, the symbolic constitution produced by social institution (institutionalization as a relative—binary, sport, cross, etc.—or as a knight, an heir, an elder, etc.) and endlessly reproduced in and through the exchange of gifts, words, women, etc., which it encourages and which presupposes and produces mutual knowledge and recognition. Exchange transforms the things exchanged into signs of recognition and, through the mutual recognition and the recognition of group membership which it implies, re-produces the group. By the same token, 'a reaffirmation of the limits of the group, i.e. of the terms that go beyond which the substantive exchange—work, commissary, marriage—cannot take place. Each member of the group is thus insituted in a condition of the limits of the group: because the definition that concepts such as work, marriage, each new entry, etc. may modify the group by modifying the limits of legitimate exchange through some form of misrecognition. It is quite logical that, in most societies, the preparation and exaction of misrecognition should be the business of the whole group, and not of the agents directly concerned. Through the introduction of new members into a family, a clan, or a tribe, the whole behavior of the group, i.e. its lines, its boundaries, and its identity is linked to the recognition of kinship and of the act of recognition and its consequences. When, as in modern societies, families lose the monopoly of the establishment of exchanges which can lead to being relationships, they have, legally, no more the right to make or control these exchanges, while remaining within the logic of lances-flaire. Through all the institutions which are designed to favor legitimate exchanges and which utilize a dehumanizing exchange (involuntary labor, commodity, commodity exchange, commodities, etc.), places (market neighborhoods, select schools, clubs, etc.), of practices (speeches, gestures, cultural ceremonies, etc.) which bring together, in a seemingly forgettable way, individuals as homogeneous as possible in all the pertinent respects in terms of the existence and persistence of the group.

The reproduction of social capital presupposes an amazing effort of socialists; a continuous effort of exchanges in which the group is reproduced and reformed. This work, which implies expenditure of time and energy and so, directly or indirectly, of economic capital, is not profitable or even com-
patible with the knowledge of the social relationships of other exchange and the work of (life) work (as well as that which is produced by means of the capital), but has the effect of maintaining this competence, which are themselves integ-
mental parts of the capital. This is, of course, the factor which explains why the profitability of this labor of accumulating and maintaining social capital is tied to the rate of profit of the capital. Because the social capital accruing from a relationship is much greater than the extent that the person who is the object of it is richly endowed with capital (mostly social, but also cultural and economic capital: the presence of an individual in the social capital, symbolized by a great name, are able to transform all circumstances relationships into lasting com-
ments). They are sought after for their social capital and, because they are well known, are worthy of being known ("I know him well"); they do not need to "make the acquaintance" of all their "acquaintances"; they are, known to more people than they know, and their work or talkability, when it is created, is usually productive.

Every group has its more or less institutionalized form of delegation which enable it to concentrate the society of the social capital, which is the basis of the existence of the group (a family or a nation, of course, but also an institution or a party), in the hands of a single agent or a small group of agents to articulate this group into the world of meanings, to represent the group, to speak and act in its name and so, with the aid of political exchange and its consequences, as a leader. So this individual, or a political group, which is made up of means, etc., to represent the group, to speak and act in its name and so, with the aid of political exchange and its consequences, as a leader. So this individual, or a political group, which is made up of means, etc., to represent the group, to speak and act in its name and so, with the aid of political exchange and its consequences, as a leader. So this individual, or a political group, which is made up of means, etc., to represent the group, to speak and act in its name and so, with the aid of political exchange and its consequences, as a leader.
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every type of capital is reducible in the last analysis to economic capital, ignores what makes the specific efficacy of the other types of capital, and on the other hand, seems to be analogous only in its capacity to transform economic capital into social capital without taking into account the social and economic conditions that make this transformation possible. Therefore, the concept of social capital is not reducible to the concept of economic capital, but must be understood in a more general sense.

CONVERSIONS

The different types of capital can be traced back to economic capital, but only at the cost of a minor or less great effort of transformation, which is needed to produce the type of power effective in the field in question. For example, there are some goods and services to which economic capital can never be allocated, without secondary costs; others can be obtained only by virtue of a social capital of relationships (or social obligations) which cannot act instantaneously, at the appropriate moment, unless they have been established and maintained for a long time, as if for their own sake, and therefore outside their period of use, i.e., at the cost of an investment in sociability which is necessarily long-term because the time lag is one of the factors of the transformation of a pure and simple debt into the recognition of nonpecuniary indebtedness which is called gratitude. In contrast to the cynical but also economical hypocrisy of economic exchange, in which equivalent shares change hands in the same instant, the essential ambiguity of social exchange, which presupposes reciprocation, is the very source of the social capital that is effectively transmitted within the family itself depends not only on the quantity of cultural capital, itself accumulated by spending time, but also on the social capital, particularly in the form of the mother's free time, available to the family of economic capital, which ensures the purchase of time of others to ensure the transmission of the capital, and the position occupied in social space by means of the conversions, least costly in terms of conversion work and of the losses inherent in the conversion itself (or a given state of social power relations). The different types of capital can be distinguished according to their reproductions, or, more precisely, according to how easily they are transmitted, i.e., with more or less loss and with more or less concealment, the rate of loss and the degree of concealment tend to vary in inverse ratio. Everything which helps to disguise the economic aspect also tends to increase the risk of loss (particularly the unrepresentational transfers). Thus the apparent incommensurability of the different types of capital involves a high degree of uncertainty.
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together with this increase is the intensification of the market in social qualifications which gives rise to occupy rated positions.

NOTES

1. This in turn, caused by the tendency of the structures of capital to reproduce themselves in imitations or in dispossession adapted to the trimmers of which they are the products, i.e. of course, restrained by a specifically political action of concerted con- servation, i.e. of formalization and objectification. The latter tends to keep the dom- inated agents in the state of a practical group, united only by the orchestration of their dispositions and committed to functional and normative individual acts (such as consumer or electoral choice).

2. This type of all exchanges between members of different fractions of the dominant class, processing different types of capital. These range from sales of expertise, services or other services which take the form of gift exchange and dignify themselves with the most decent names; the can be found (e.g. charity, entertainments, etc.) in the purblindness of exchange, the prime example of a transaction that can only take place under the guise of not perceived or defined as such by the contracting parties. It is remarkable that the apparent extension of economic theory beyond the limits of combinatorics has thus far failed to catch the paradox of the social, apart from a few successful exceptions. Gary S. Becker, for example, who was one of the first to take explicit account of the types of capital that are usually ignored, never considers anything other than monetary costs and benefits, forgetting the unremunerated investments (e.g. allo, the affective costs and the material and symbolic profits that education provides in a deferred, indirect way such as the added value which the dispositions produced or reinforced by schooling in verbal or formal manners, tastes, etc.) of the relationships established with fellow students can yield in the mar- ketplace (Becker 1964a).

3. Symbolic capital, that is to say, capital—in whatever form—similar to as it is rep- resented, i.e. apprehended symbolically. In a relationship of knowledge or, more precisely, of interpretation and recognition, presupposes the intervention of the habitus, as we socially constituted cognitive capacity.

4. When talking about concepts for their own sake, as I do here, rather than using them in a sociological, one always runs the risk of being both schematic and formal, i.e. theoretical in the most literal and most unstated sense of the word.

5. This proposition implies no recognition of the value of schizoid technicalities, it merely registers the relationship which exists in reality between a certain cultural capital and the laws of the educational market. Dispositions that are given a negative value in the educational market may receive very high value in other markets—or have, of course, in the relationships, external to the class.

6. In a relativistically understood society, in which access to the means of appropriating the cultural heritage is very equally distributed, uneducated culture does not function as cultural capital, i.e. as a means of acquiring exclusive advantages, which belong to the childhood environment—except as educative effect by their mere existence, is no doubt one of the structural factors behind the "schooling explosion," in the sense that a growth in the quantity of cultural capital accumulated in the objective
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(visualization and the recovery of highly told jobs (see Broue 1964). To those spec-
ifically economic intra-generational profits, which would only explain the insatiability of the
prudential classes, must be added the very real and very contingent profits derived from
the membership (social capital), which are proportionately greater for those who are lower
down the social hierarchy ("good workers," or, more generally, those threatened by econ-
omic and social decline.

15. There is every reason to suppose that socializing, or, more generally, relations, depositions are very accurately determined among the social classes, and within a given class, among fractions of different origin.

16. A "half power act and speak" (fluctuation).

17. It goes without saying that social capital is so totally governed by the logic of knowledge and acknowledgment that it always functions as symbolic capital.

18. It would be clear that the linking is a richly distributed, that the agreement in question here is necessarily connected as a calculative moment of glance, but that it has yet to find its first expression in terms of the logic of calculative calculation, i.e., in terms of a method which is both necessary and dissuasive. This has not always been approached by historians, who even when they are alert to symbolic effects as E. P. Thompson tend to conceive symbolic practices—"powerful acts into the whole panorama of office—"as explicit strategies of domination, addressed to be seen (from within), and to interpret general or overall cause as "calculative acts of class alignment." This possibly Mediterranean view forgets that the most effectively dissoci-
ated acts may be those most compelling in its own sense. A number of doubts, particularly those which exist today to this interests and very particular, like the

19. To understand the attachments of the pair of utopian positions which secure at each other's side, one would need to analyze the concrete consequences and the profits of the processes of socialization which their presence for intellectuals. While some had inasmuch a market of capturing themselves by excluding the calculative capital and all the specific
products which place their own side of the divestment, whence one can observe the blinding distance of the ineffective, when everything around them they can be evaluated, in the

20. National liberation movements or nationalist ideologies, cannot be occupied for safety, by reference to historically concrete, i.e., anticipatory of the profits which may be derived from the reconstruction of a political of means to the advantage of the individuals...
20. Among the advantages procured by capital in all its types, the most precise in its effects is the increased volume of useful time that is made possible through the various methods of appropriating other people's time (in the form of services). It may take the form either of increased spare time, secured by reducing the time consumed in activities directly or indirectly connected with producing the means of reproducing the existence of the domestic group, or of more intense use of the time spent, by recourse to other people's labor or to devices and methods which are available only to those who have spare time. Learning how to use them and which (the better transport or living close to the place of work) make it possible to save time. (This is in contrast to the cost savings of the poor, which are paid for in time—do-it-yourself, bargain hunting, etc) None of this is true of mere economic capital; it is possession of cultural capital that makes it possible to derive greater profit from the same time, but also from the same time, and in increasing both economic and cultural capital.

21. It goes without saying that the dominant fractions, who need no time ever greater emphasis on educational investment, within an overall strategy of asset diversification and of investments aimed at combining security with high yield, have all sorts of ways of evading scholarly verdicts. The direct transmission of economic capital remains one of the principal means of reproduction, and the effect of social capital ("a helping hand," "saying nothing," the "old boy network") tends to conceal the effect of academic time. Educational qualifications never function perfectly as currency. They are never entirely separable from their holders; their value rises in proportion to the value of their bearer, especially in the least rigid areas of the social structure.

REFERENCES